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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 16-3625 
_____________ 
 
ROMAN ILDEFONSO-CANDELARIO, 
                                                 Petitioner  
 
 v. 
 
 ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA, 
                                               Respondent  
_______________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
United States Department of Justice 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(BIA 1:A208-443-783) 
Immigration Judge: Hon. Walter A. Durling 
_______________ 
 
Argued June 12, 2017 
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Before:   JORDAN, KRAUSE, Circuit Judges and 
STEARNS*, District Judge. 
 
(Filed: August 3, 2017) 
_______________ 
 
Daniel B. Conklin  [ARGUED] 
The Shagin Law Group 
120 South Street 
The Inns of St. Jude 
Harrisburg, PA   17101 
          Counsel for Petitioner  
 
Chad A. Readler 
John S. Hogan 
Brianne W. Cohen 
Rebecca H. Phillips   [ARGUED] 
Stefanie A. Svoren-Jay 
United States Department of Justice 
Office of Immigration Litigation 
P.O. Box 878 
Ben Franklin Station 
Washington, DC   20044 
          Counsel for Respondent 
_______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
                                              
 * Honorable Richard G. Stearns, United States District 
Court Judge for the District of Massachusetts, sitting by 
designation. 
3 
 
STEARNS, District Judge.   
 Petitioner Roman Ildefonso-Candelario challenges a 
ruling of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upholding 
an Immigration Judge’s determination that he is statutorily 
ineligible for cancellation of removal because of a prior 
conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude.  For the 
following reasons, we will grant the petition and remand to 
the BIA for further proceedings. 
 
I. Background 
 
 Ildefonso-Candelario, a citizen of Mexico, entered the 
United States unlawfully, allegedly in 1996.  In October of 
2015, he pled guilty in Pennsylvania state court to a 
misdemeanor count of obstructing the administration of law 
or other governmental function.  See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 5101.  The following March, Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE) took Ildefonso-Candelario into custody, 
charging him with being removable as a result of being an 
alien present without admission or parole.  See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i).  At his first hearing before the 
Immigration Judge, Ildefonso-Candelario conceded 
removability on the basis of his prior unlawful entry, but 
announced his intention to seek cancellation of removal.  See 
id. § 1229b(b)(1)(A)-(D).  In response, counsel for ICE 
suggested that Ildefonso-Candelario’s prior conviction might 
qualify as a crime involving moral turpitude,1 see id. 
                                              
1  The word “turpitude” is a 15th-century borrowing 
into the English language of the French “turpitude” or the 
Latin “turpitudo,” meaning “base.”  Turpitude, Oxford 
English Dictionary (2d ed. 1989); see, e.g., William 
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§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), which would render him statutorily 
ineligible for cancellation of removal, see id. 
§ 1229b(b)(1)(C). 
 
 Shortly thereafter, the Immigration Judge issued an 
initial ruling holding that section 5101 was “categorically” a 
crime involving moral turpitude.  On the same day that the 
Immigration Judge issued his ruling, ICE added a charge of 
removability for committing a crime involving moral 
turpitude against Ildefonso-Candelario.  See id. 
§ 1227(a)(2)(i)(I).  At his next hearing before the Immigration 
Judge, Ildefonso-Candelario moved for reconsideration of the 
Immigration Judge’s ruling on section 5101.  The 
Immigration Judge rejected Ildefonso-Candelario’s 
arguments, again holding that section 5101 is categorically a 
morally turpitudinous crime.  The Immigration Judge then 
ordered Ildefonso-Candelario removed to Mexico.  Ildefonso-
Candelario took an appeal to the BIA.   
 
 A single member of the BIA upheld the ruling “[f]or 
the reasons given by the Immigration Judge.”  App. at 4.  This 
timely petition followed.  While the petition was pending, the 
government moved to remand the matter to the BIA for 
further consideration.  That motion was referred to the merits 
panel for our consideration. 
 
II. Discussion 
 
                                                                                                     
Shakespeare, Antony and Cleopatra act 4, sc. 6 (“I am alone 
the villain of the earth, and feel I am so most.  O Antony, thou 
mine of bounty, how wouldst thou have paid my better 
service, when my turpitude thou dost so crown with gold!”). 
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 When the BIA adopts an immigration judge’s decision 
and reasoning, we review both rulings.  See Quao Lin Dong v. 
Att’y Gen., 638 F.3d 223, 227 (3d Cir. 2011).  Whether an 
offense is a crime involving moral turpitude is a question of 
law subject to de novo review.  See Javier v. Att’y Gen., 826 
F.3d 127, 130 (3d Cir. 2016).  Typically, we accord so-called 
Chevron deference2 to the BIA’s reasonable determination 
that an offense is a turpitudinous crime.  Mehboob v. Att’y 
Gen., 549 F.3d 272, 275 (3d Cir. 2008).  Here, however, the 
government concedes that the BIA’s decision—a non-
precedential disposition issued by a single member—is not 
entitled to Chevron deference.  See Mahn v. Att’y Gen., 767 
F.3d 170, 173 (3d Cir. 2014).  In any event, we do not defer 
to the BIA’s interpretation of criminal statutes.  Mehboob, 
549 F.3d at 275. 
 
 To determine whether an offense involves moral 
turpitude, the BIA and this court apply a categorical 
approach.3  See, e.g., Partyka v. Att’y Gen., 417 F.3d 408, 411 
(3d Cir. 2005).  Under the categorical approach, we examine 
the elements of the offense “to ascertain the least culpable 
conduct necessary to sustain [a] conviction under the statute.”  
Jean-Louis v. Att’y Gen., 582 F.3d 462, 465-66 (3d Cir. 
2009).  A morally turpitudinous offense involves “conduct 
                                              
2 The doctrine is derived from Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984). 
 
3 The government does not suggest that section 5101 is 
a divisible offense, which would permit application of the 
modified categorical approach.  See Chavez-Alvarez v. Att’y 
Gen., 850 F.3d 583, 587-88 (3d Cir. 2017). 
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that is inherently base, vile, or depraved, contrary to the 
accepted rules of morality and the duties owed other persons, 
either individually or to society in general.”  Knapik v. 
Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 84, 89 (3d Cir. 2004).  “[T]he hallmark of 
moral turpitude is a reprehensible act committed with an 
appreciable level of consciousness or deliberation.”  Partyka, 
417 F.3d at 414.  If an offense can be committed without 
rising to this level of depravity, it is not categorically a crime 
involving moral turpitude.  See Mahn, 767 F.3d at 174. 
 
 Section 5101, the Pennsylvania statute at issue, 
provides: 
 
A person commits a misdemeanor of the second 
degree if he intentionally obstructs, impairs or 
perverts the administration of law or other 
governmental function by force, violence, 
physical interference or obstacle, breach of 
official duty, or any other unlawful act, except 
that this section does not apply to flight by a 
person charged with crime, refusal to submit to 
arrest, failure to perform a legal duty other than 
an official duty, or any other means of avoiding 
compliance with law without affirmative 
interference with governmental functions. 
 
The Immigration Judge and the BIA analogized the statute to 
those considered in a line of BIA decisions addressing 
convictions for fraudulently and deliberately obstructing 
governmental functions.  In Matter of Flores, 17 I. & N. Dec. 
225 (BIA 1980), the BIA concluded that a conviction for 
falsifying immigration papers, 18 U.S.C. § 1426(b), qualified 
as a crime of moral turpitude.  As the BIA observed, “crimes 
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in which fraud [is] an ingredient have always been regarded 
as involving moral turpitude.”  Id. at 228 (quoting Jordan v. 
De George, 341 U.S. 223, 232 (1951)).  Because the offense 
at issue in Matter of Flores required that an offender “impair 
or obstruct an important function of a department of the 
government by defeating its efficiency or destroying the value 
of its lawful operations by deceit, graft, trickery, or dishonest 
means,” id. at 229, and that the offender have knowledge of 
the counterfeit nature of the papers, the BIA held that 
“fraudulent conduct is implicit in the statute,” id. at 230.  The 
BIA subsequently relied on Matter of Flores in holding that a 
conviction under a Pennsylvania statute forbidding making 
written false statements to government officials “with intent 
to mislead a public servant in performing his official 
function,” 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4904(a), also involved moral 
turpitude.  Matter of Jurado-Delgado, 24 I. & N. Dec. 29, 33-
35 (BIA 2006).  In such cases, “it is the intent to mislead that 
is the controlling factor.”  Id. at 35. 
 
 The problem with this analogy is that section 5101 
encompasses non-fraudulent as well as fraudulent conduct, 
such as obstruction by “physical interference or obstacle.”  
The Immigration Judge recognized the breadth of this 
monition, but concluded that the fact that a perpetrator 
“intentionally obstructs, impairs or perverts the administration 
of law or other governmental function” categorically 
incorporates morally turpitudinous conduct.  The BIA 
adopted this reasoning, citing Matter of Jurado-Delgado for 
the proposition that “the ‘controlling factor’ is the intent to 
obstruct, impair, or pervert the lawful operations of 
government.”  App. at 5. 
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 This interpretation is unsupportable.  To begin, as the 
government concedes, Matter of Jurado-Delgado focused on 
the intent to mislead, not the mere intent to obstruct.  24 I. & 
N. Dec. at 35.  Thus, the intent to impair or obstruct 
governmental functions, standing alone, is not morally 
turpitudinous under the BIA’s decisions; the obstruction must 
occur “by deceit, graft, trickery, or dishonest means.”4  Id. 
 
 With that bedrock interpretative principle in mind, 
section 5101 plainly sweeps in conduct which does not 
involve fraudulent or deceptive efforts to hinder government 
action.  Nothing in the text of the statute requires fraudulent 
or otherwise deceptive conduct as a necessary element of 
committing the offense.  Applications of the statute in state 
cases confirm this reading.  In Commonwealth v. 
Mastrangelo, for example, a defendant was convicted under 
section 5101 after shouting profanities and insults at a “meter 
maid” who ticketed his car, intimidating her from patrolling 
the street where defendant’s business was located for 
approximately a week.  414 A.2d 54, 55-56 (Pa. 1980).  The 
defendant’s “course of disorderly conduct,” the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court held, “intentionally obstructed a meter maid 
from carrying out her lawful duties.”  Id. at 60.  Similarly, in 
Commonwealth v. Ripley, the Superior Court concluded that 
section 5101 covered the actions of protestors who used 
“lock-boxes” to link themselves together to block an 
                                              
4 We note that this understanding of the BIA’s 
precedents and the definition of moral turpitude accords with 
other Circuits that have addressed statutes involving 
obstruction, perjury, or false statements.  See Flores-Molina 
v. Sessions, 850 F.3d 1150, 1171-72 (10th Cir. 2017) 
(collecting cases). 
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intersection and “physically obstruct lawful police efforts to 
ensure that public streets were free from obstruction.”  833 
A.2d 155, 161 (Pa. Super. 2003).  The locks “interfere[d] with 
police efforts to disperse the protest” and were covered “in tar 
and chicken wire, for the sole purpose of slowing down police 
efforts to disassemble the human chain.”  Id. 
 
 The list of examples could go on.  Further discussion 
would be largely supererogatory, however, because the 
government admits that section 5101 cannot categorically be 
a crime involving moral turpitude under Matter of Flores and 
Matter of Jurado-Delgado.  Whatever may be said of the 
examples offered of conduct prosecuted under section 5101, 
neither involves fraud or the obstruction of governmental 
functions “by deceit, graft, trickery, or dishonest means.”5  
Matter of Flores, 17 I. & N. Dec. at 229. 
                                              
5 Ildefonso-Candelario devotes much of his brief to the 
proposition that minor assaults on law enforcement officers 
generally do not involve moral turpitude unless “there is 
deliberate conduct and an aggravating factor,” such as the use 
of a deadly weapon, Partyka, 417 F.3d at 415, or an element 
of intentionally inflicted bodily injury, see Matter of Danesh, 
19 I. & N. Dec. 669, 673 (BIA 1988).  No such aggravating 
factor is required under section 5101.  See, e.g., 
Commonwealth v. Love, 896 A.2d 1276, 1283-85 (Pa. Super. 
2006) (affirming a conviction under section 5101 for pushing 
a courtroom bailiff who was attempting to quiet defendant’s 
wife).  The government, however, does not attempt to defend 
the decisions below on this ground, acknowledging in its brief 
that any physical obstacle can suffice, and that the “physical 
obstruction need not be forceful or violent.”  Resp’t Br. at 16 
n.3. 
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 Instead of defending the conclusion that section 5101 
is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude, the 
government requests a remand without decision to permit the 
BIA to reconsider its position in the matter.   See Ren v. 
Gonzales, 440 F.3d 446, 448 (7th Cir. 2006); see generally 
SKF USA Inc. v. United States, 254 F.3d 1022, 1027-30 (Fed. 
Cir. 2001) (outlining approaches to agency remand requests).  
The government points out that the BIA is generally entitled 
to Chevron deference for reasonable interpretations of 
ambiguous terms, Mehboob, 549 F.3d at 275, and theorizes 
that the BIA might conjure up an interpretation of the term 
“moral turpitude” enabling a conclusion that section 5101 
categorically involves “conduct that is inherently base, vile, 
or depraved,” Knapik, 384 F.3d at 89. 
 
 Yet the government has been unable, either in its brief 
or at oral argument, to articulate any understanding of the 
phrase “crime involving moral turpitude” that could plausibly 
encompass section 5101.  This is not because of a failure of 
imagination.  It instead reflects the simple fact that there is no 
conceivable way to describe the least culpable conduct 
covered by section 5101 — such as the illegal but nonviolent 
political protest described in Ripley — as inherently vile, or 
as “a reprehensible act committed with an appreciable level of 
consciousness or deliberation.”  Partyka, 417 F.3d at 414.  
Moreover, no “emerging case law,” Ren, 440 F.3d at 448, 
involving either section 5101 or the definition of moral 
turpitude in other contexts calls for giving the BIA a second 
bite at the apple.  See Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 469 (declining 
to remand where the relevant legal materials, including BIA 
decisions, “lead[] inexorably to the conclusion” that an 
offense is not morally turpitudinous). 
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 Under the circumstances, we see no reason for 
remanding without correcting the legal error apparent on the 
face of the petition.  See Mayorga v. Att’y Gen., 757 F.3d 
126, 134 (3d Cir. 2014); cf. City of Arlington v. FCC, 133 S. 
Ct. 1863, 1874 (2013) (“[W]here Congress has established an 
ambiguous line, the agency can go no further than the 
ambiguity will fairly allow.”).  We thus deny the 
government’s request for a voluntary remand and hold that 18 
Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5101 is not categorically a crime involving 
moral turpitude. 
 
III. Conclusion 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will grant Ildefonso-
Candelario’s petition and remand to the BIA for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
